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II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Standard of Review on Appeal is Increased when the Burden 
of Proof is Higher than the Preponderance of the Evidence. 
It has been acknowledged in Utah that the comparative degrees of proof of facts 
means that Findings of Fact rest more on probabilities and not an absolute certainties. There 
are three (3) recognized standards of proof in civil cases. They are: (i) proof by the 
preponderance of the evidence, (ii) proof by clear and convincing evidence, and (iii) proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Nellie Lovett v. Continental Bank 4 Ut.2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065 
(Utah 1955); Richard H. Holder v. Ruth Holder 9 Ut.2d 163, 340 P.2d 761 (Utah 1959). 
When a fact must be proven by a heightened decree of proof, then the Appellate Court 
uses a higher level of review regarding the evidence. The courts have declared that, without 
the difference in appellate review, then the increased level of required proof becomes 
meaningless. Nellie Lovett v. Continental Bank 4 Ut.2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1955). 
An order of the court can be technically violated or it can be violated in a manner 
which is contemptuous. This is a case of the latter. (Appellee Brief p. 17). Contempt must 
be established by clear and convincing evidence, therefore the existence of any disputed fact 
must be shown to be "highly probable". The Utah Supreme Court has also held that the 
quantum and the value of the evidence must be consistent with the degree of proof required 
in the case. Nellie Lovett v. Continental Bank 4 Ut.2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1955). 
The Findings of Fact on contempt are contained in the final order. (Record pp. 1346-
1350). The Findings of Fact fails to address all of the elements of contempt. The Findings 
-1-
are neither fact intensive nor fact sensitive. The Findings are not supported by the actual 
evidence and to a high degree of probability. The failure to enter detailed Findings of Fact 
constitute an abuse of discretion. The sanctions must be also vacated. (Record p. 1349, <ft6). 
B. The District Court did not Properly Obtain Contempt Jurisdiction over the Respondent. 
The Appellant objected to the Court's contempt jurisdiction on several grounds. They 
were overruled. (Record pp. 1346-1349, f^lfl and 7; Contempt Trial pp. 50-51 and 54). 
The Appellee does not challenge the applicability of the provisions of UCA §78-32-1 
et. seq. However, when the initiating contempt pleadings were filed, no reference to the 
controlling law was cited. (Record pp. 1172-1189, 1221-1231). The Appellee admits that 
no affidavits were filed but states that a substitute "verified" pleading was filed. (Appellee 
Brief p. 17). The "verified" pleading was filed after the fact and is inadequate as a matter of 
law. The "verified" memorandum does not meet the minimum content requirements for an 
affidavit or UCA §78-32-3. The affidavit must on its face indicate that the affiant has 
firsthand knowledge about which he is testifying about, that the evidence being offered is in 
admissible form, and the acts which constitute the contempt are set forth with particularity. 
Emeline Young v. George O. Cannon 2 Utah 560 (Utah 1880). (Record pp. 1221-1226). 
For example, when Summary Judgment is sought, the affidavits must contain specific 
evidentiary facts. Graham L. Treloggan v. Curtis L. Treloggan 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). 
The affidavits must disclose (based upon the facts set forth in the document) that the affiant 
has personal knowledge of the facts. This required critical information cannot be presumed 
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to be present. Utah Farm Production Credit v. Milo W. Watts 737 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987). 
The affidavit must show how the affiant obtained his personal information and the source of 
his facts so that issues of hearsay and personal knowledge can be determined by the Court. 
Finally, an affidavit containing improper heresay or opinion testimony may not be 
relied upon. J.B. Walker v. Rockv Mountain Recreation 29 Ut.2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 
1973). More importantly, an affidavit that merely recites unsubstantiated conclusions or fails 
to state evidentiary facts is legally defective. Shawn William v. Kenneth Melby 699 P.2d 
723 (Utah 1985); Janese Norton v. Beckv Blackham 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). The 
supposed "verified" memorandum violates all of these rules of law. Mr. Miller was not 
present when many of the acts of contempt were supposedly committed. His verification of 
the same is based on hearsay and double hearsay. (Record pp. 1221 -1226). The purpose of 
the Affidavit is to identify the specific acts that represent a prima facie case of contempt. 
This is to be ascertained before the cost and the expense of a trial is imposed on the accused. 
The Appellee, in his brief, claims that because there was an eventual hearing that this 
somehow cures the defect. (Appellee Brief p. 18). The defenses were not waived. (Record 
pp. 1246-1249; Contempt Trial pp. 50-51 and 54). When the evidentiary hearing began, the 
Appellant was required to present her defense before a prima facie case (and the specific 
evidence on which the contempt rests) was even made known. This was clear error of law. 
C. The Use of a Mailing Certificate to Commence an Action 
Regarding Contempt is Improper As a Matter of Law. 
One of the procedural objections that was made was the "mailing" of the contempt 
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pleadings to the accused. (Record p. 1247, fflfl and 2; Contempt Trial p. 50, lines 15-18). 
The Appellee concedes that each Order to Show Cause was not personally served 
upon the nominal defendant. (Appellee Brief p. 18). The defense is that since the divorce 
was ongoing, the Order to Show Cause and related pleadings can be mailed to the other 
party. The Appellee fails to acknowledge that contempt is an independent action. This has 
been the law of the State of Utah for over 120 years. Emeline Young v. George O. Cannon 
2 Utah 560 (Utah 1880). Contempt introduces new and very different issues into the case. 
The Appellee cites no legal authority for the proposition that contempt charges is not 
a separate legal matter. In contrast, the only cited case that has allowed the contempt 
pleadings to be "mailed" is where a party has previously been shown to be evading service 
of legal process. Bruno D'Aston v. Dorothy D'Aston 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
(Record pp. 1290, and 1266-1293 [i.e. the return of service in the D'Aston case as to evading 
service of legal process]). The D' Aston case did not overrule the prior law. 
D. The Evidentiary Hearing on the Contempt Allegation 
was Procedurally and Substantively Defective. 
The various activities before the Court Commissioners are legally irrelevant because 
the Commissioner cannot, and did not, conduct any hearing on the merits of the case. 
Margaret Holm v. Michael Smilowitz 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The evidentiary 
hearing regarding contempt as conducted by the Judge was improper as a matter of law. 
The evidentiary hearing was defective for the following legal reasons: (i) no prima 
facie case of contempt was set forth in the initiating pleadings and which existed in 
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admissible form and content; (ii) the accused was required to present her defenses to the 
allegations before the accuser put on any evidence, (iii) the clear mandatory provisions of 
UCA §§78-32-3 and 9 had not been satisfied, (iv) the specific written order regarding the 
1999 Halloween contempt claim was never identified in the pleadings or during the trial, (v) 
the court had already judged the anticipated evidence, and (vi) the record fails to prove that 
the father showed up on Halloween to pick up the child and therefore, the wife cannot be 
guilty of any denial of the visitation. (Contempt Trial pp. 51-55). 
The Judge, in advance of hearing the specific evidence, had already determined that 
Mrs. Miller was in contempt. (Contempt Trial p. 43, lines 4-24, and pp. 46-49). This is 
wrong as a matter of law. UCA §78-23-9. By law, he must hear any asserted defenses. The 
evidentiary hearing before the trial judge was but a few hours and was not a foil day trial as 
claimed by the Appellee. (Contempt Trial p. 49, lines 7-17 and 53-54; Appellee Brief p. 19). 
E. There is No Proof of Contempt Regarding Halloween as a Matter of Law. 
The Halloween contempt conduct is not governed by the Decree of Divorce because 
it had not yet been entered. No alternative order was cited by the Court or the accuser either 
during the trial or in the initiating pleadings. (Record pp. 1172,1181, and 1221 -1231). The 
duty of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a specific order was violated rests with 
the accuser and not the accused. If the proper order is the Divorce Decree, then contempt 
cannot exist as a matter of law because of the detailed language contained in the order. 
Before any evidence was heard, the court declared that the children's desires would have no 
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weight. (Contempt Trial p. 46, lines 8-20). This is an unilateral change in the Decree of 
Divorce without notice. It is a judicial ex post facto law and is erroneous as a matter of law. 
Even if the Decree of Divorce is the proper order for the Halloween dispute and even 
if the children do not have any say in the matter, then the Standard Visitation Schedule does 
not contain a "Halloween" visitation provision. UCA §30-3-35(f). Finally, there is no 
evidence that the father went to the home to pick-up his daughter and was then and there 
denied any visitation. To the contrary, the evidence suggest that Mr. Miller nonetheless 
(perhaps reluctantly) allowed the child to do what she had done in years past which was to 
trick or treat with friends and family. (Contempt Trial pp. 66-67). 
F. There is No Proof as to Contempt Regarding the Removal of the Child's Computer. 
There is no evidence at all that Mrs. Miller entered the residence and personally 
removed the computer from Mr. Miller's home. (Contempt Trial pp. 70-72). The child is 
allowed to do with her own property as she deems proper at least until there is an objection 
made. There is no evidence at all that Mrs. Miller suggested to the child that she remove the 
computer from the home. (Contempt Trial pp. 70-74). Indeed, where in the initiating 
pleadings (i.e. the verified memorandum) does the evidence exist that support the allegation? 
Mr. Miller was not present to witness this incident. (Contempt Trial pp. 155-157). The 
children did not testify about the incident. There is no evidence at all that the accused exited 
any vehicle, entered the yard, and then entered into the home and took the computer or that 
she enlisted any child's help to do so. (Appellee Brief p. 20; Contempt Trial pp. 67-75). 
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There is no evidence that any order of the court was violated when the child brought 
out the computer. (Contempt Trial p. 72, lines 17-19). The Appellee claims that the accused 
knew or should have known that the child's conduct would create "a serious problem". 
(Appellee Brief p. 21). Even if this is true, such belief would not violate any identified order. 
The Appellee in his brief suggests that Mrs. Miller assisted in removing the computer 
from the home or at least asked her son, Brady, to help. (Appellee Brief p. 25). No trial 
record or other evidence is cited for this factual claim. This assertion is actually contrary to 
the evidence. (Contempt Trial pp. 72- 73). The name of the witness who saw this event or 
heard Mrs. Miller ask for the child's assistance is not even identified in the pleadings. 
The fact that the accused did not then and there force the child to return the computer 
to the home is ngt an act of contempt. The Judge declared that an^ entry into the home by 
Mrs. Miller would violate the prior orders of the court. (Contempt Trial pp. 47-48). The 
court's Findings of Fact are erroneous and the resulting legal conclusions are also wrong. 
G. The Uncontroverted Testimony of Competent and Knowledgeable Witnesses 
Must be Accepted as True Absent Specific Findings or Evidence to the Contrary. 
The rule of law is that when a witness testifies (or provides evidence) as to any fact 
and the testimony of the witness is not discredited by other competent evidence, and where 
the testimony itself is not improbable, then the testimony of the witness is to be accepted as 
true by the court or the fact finder. This rule is particularly important where the testimony 
of Mrs. Miller is not materially challenged. 30 Am.Jur.2d Evidence §1083; 81 Am.Jur.2d 
Witnesses §660; West v. Sinclair 90 F.Supp. 307 (DC WD Mo. 1950); Wichita Terminal 
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Elevator v. Commissioner 47-2 USTC 1J9253, 162 F.2d 513 (CA-10 1947). The Federal 
District Court, in the West v. Sinclair case, stated the rule of law as follows: 
"It is the duty of the Court and the jury in every case to view the testimony 
upon the theory that the witnesses are telling the truth." 
The court predetermined the outcome. She was going to be held in contempt despite 
the evidence, despite the lack of any order, and despite the wording of the Divorce Decree. 
H. The Hockey Game Incident Does Not Constitute Contempt as a Matter of Law. 
The hockey game incident does not amount to civil contempt. The Appellee claims 
that the accused approached the daughter and then independently convinced the child to go 
home with her. (Appellee Brief p. 21). There was no evidence presented that this, in fact, 
occurred as claimed. The only evidence that exists in the record was that it was the child's 
personal decision to go home with her mother. (Contempt Trial pp. 75-76). Under the terms 
of the Decree of Divorce this conduct cannot amount to contempt as a matter of law. 
I. The Christmas Incident Does Not Amount to Contempt as a Matter of Law. 
The second Order to Show Cause claims that the children were improperly removed 
from school b^ Mrs. Miller on December 2\* and 22nd, 1999. (Record p. 1239,1J3). The 
children missed only a single day of school. (Contempt Trial p. 78). It is true that the boys 
were not in school on Wednesday, December 23, 1999 but it is not true that they were out 
of school on Monday and Tuesday. In fact, they were with their father until Tuesday night, 
December 22nd, 1999. (Contempt Trial p. 79, lines 1-7). The Order to Show Cause is clearly 
directed at school attendance on Monday and Tuesday and not Wednesday. (Record pp. 
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1238-1240). The Christmas vacation was planned months in advance and Mr. Miller was 
fully aware of the same. (Contempt Trial pp. 79-80). Mr. Miller did not claim that he never 
knew about the intended holiday visit. (Contempt Trial pp. 155- 156). In fact, he knew 
about the trip sufficiently far in advance so that he could instruct his lawyer to object to the 
same and create a crisis on the eve of the departure. (Record pp. 1291 and 1293; [Letter of 
Mr. Woodhall of 12-17-99]; Contempt Trial pp. 79 and 136-137). 
The accused in response to the attorney's letter acknowledged the objection and 
simply cautioned Mr. Miller (via. his lawyer) of the possible consequences of this last minute 
objection. (Record p. 1293). At this point in time, the father had a choice. He could either 
allow the scheduled Christmas visitation or he could stand on his objection. He chose the 
former. This was his act of acquiescence. In fact, under the Decree of Divorce, he was 
actually obligated to cooperate and not obstruct the visitation the wife is entitled to have with 
her sons. (Decree of Divorce %3; Record p. 1123; Addendum No. 4, p. 35). 
J. A Person Cannot be Held in Contempt for Violating 
the Spirit of an Order as a Matter of Law. 
The Appellee claims the contempt can be justified because the accused violated the 
"spirit" of the orders. (Appellee Brief p. 22). As a matter of law, such is not possible though 
it is clear the Trial Judge held otherwise. (Record p. 1348, *|3; Contempt Trial p. 49, lines 
19-25). There must be a clear order. If the order is then violated and if it is done in a certain 
fashion, then and only then, does it become contemptuous. If any of the essential elements 
of contempt are lacking, then the conduct it is not contemptuous as a matter of law. 
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The Appellee suggests that a clear order existed as to Halloween 1999. (Appellee 
Brief pp. 23-24). There is no doubt that the Decree of Divorce had riot been entered on the 
dates of the alleged improper conduct. (Record p. 1130). Therefore, as a matter of law, the 
Decree of Divorce cannot be used to support the contempt citation. The Appellee then 
concedes that some prior order must therefore govern. (Appellee Brief p. 24). However, the 
specific order that was violated still remains unidentified even in the appellate briefs. 
The Appellee, in his brief, also suggests that the parties cannot allow the children to 
make any decisions regarding visitation. (Appellee Brief p. 25). The Respondent sought out 
and obtained a very detailed Decree of Divorce that contains very unique language and 
confers specific rights and prerogatives upon the children that the parents are both court 
ordered to obey. These specific provisions were prepared by Mr. Miller's attorney of record. 
The precise language selected was then adopted by the Court. The court cannot unilaterally 
change the terms of the Order. (Contempt Trial p. 43, lines 16-24; and p. 46, lines 14-20). 
The wisdom and propriety of the selected language can be questioned, but the orders still 
remain. Therefore, Mrs. Miller's conduct (even if stupid, improvident or unwise) cannot be 
contemptuous as a matter of law. When the daughter desired to return to the custodial parent 
(i.e. her mother), that wish under the Divorce Decree is to be honored by both parents. 
K. The Procedure Prescribed for Determining Contempt is Both Procedural and Substantive. 
The Appellee, in his brief, suggests that in the absence of some surprise or prejudice, 
the failure to comply with the provisions of UCA §78-32-1 et. seq., and the Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure is acceptable. (Appellee Brief p. 23). The rule of law is not optional. 
Emetine Young v. George O. Cannon 2 Utah 560 (Utah 1880). These rules and statutes 
confer substantial procedural and substantive rights on the accused. The accused is entitled 
to know the specific facts and evidence on which the claim is based. This includes the 
identity of the witnesses who condemn the accused. This can only be accomplished with a 
detailed fact sensitive affidavit based upon first hand knowledge. The accused cannot be 
required to present any defense before the claimant has presented a prima facie case. 
(Contempt Trial pp. 43 and 54-56, lines 18-21). Such violates the provisions of UCA §78-
23-9 and violates constitutional protections of "due process of law." 
L. The Adverse Influence Rule Applies in Domestic Law Cases. 
The Appellee claims that the adverse influence rule does not apply or perhaps should 
not apply in family law matters. (Appellee Brief p. 27) Why would it not apply in the type 
of litigation that affects more individual and families than any other? In fact, it must apply 
so that spouses are not tempted to mislead the court. Rarely are the spouses of equal 
knowledge or understanding regarding their financial matters and neither party may be fully 
apprized of the disposition of marital assets. This lack of knowledge regarding assets and 
income is especially true after the couple separate. Any other rule of law invites mischief. 
The Appellee suggests that this rule of law should not apply to persons who have 
chosen to opt out of society. (Appellee Brief p. 27). By refusing to provide the required 
evidence that rich and poor individuals are required to have (i.e. personal and business 
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income tax returns for example), the party actually compels the court to guess on the most 
important issues in the case. Divorce trials should not be reduced to guess work. 
The wife prepared and filed her income tax returns under oath, identified her modest 
income, and provided the same to the court so that the child support guidelines can be 
complied with. She even agreed that her earnings ability could be treated as being a bit 
higher. At the very least, Mr. Miller could have, and should have, provided the last personal 
income tax return that he did in fact file. The reason he did not do this is because even this 
document would prove that he earns more than $500.00 per month as he has continually 
claimed during the pendency of the case. (Record pp. 191-193; Divorce Trial p. 278, lines 
6-14). This claimed level of income was rejected by the District Court, because it was not 
candid. (Record p. 191). The Appellee also fails to identify the state or federal law that 
exempts him from providing current and historical financial information to the court. Mr. 
Miller did not provide this evidence because of his declared objectives which was to avoid 
his obligations to his wife which is rooted in his continued anger towards her. (Divorce Trial 
pp.78-80 [the assault incident]; p. 176 [dealing with his denial of any anger]; Contempt Trial 
pp. 60- 66)[the rock throwing episode]). Mr. Miller paid child support only when he felt he 
could. (Divorce Trial p. 294, lines 2-7). 
Trial Exhibit Nos. 61 and 63 fall way short of providing the required information on 
the most critical factor in a divorce action. Any income that the assets and businesses 
generate both historically and currently is of critical importance. To the extent the court has 
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fixed the financial obligations of the parties on the finding that Mr. Miller earns $2,500.00 
per month, such is clearly erroneous, misapplies positive law, and is relegated to nothing 
more than a guess. (Record p. 1113; Finding of Fact ^21; Addendum No. 5, p. 49). 
The Appellee claims the wife's evidence (consisting of about sixteen (16) Trial 
Exhibits) as to Mr. Miller's historic earnings ability is simply not credible. (Appellee Brief 
p. 29). In stark contrast, Mr. Miller offered no meaningful and verifiable evidence as to his 
personal income except for an unsigned Financial Declaration Form dated March 25th, 1999. 
(Addendum No. 12; Trial Exhibit No. 6; Divorce Trial p. 80, lines 21). Since Mr. Miller 
failed to provide elucidating evidence regarding his current personal income, then the only 
evidence before the court is the historic earnings ability of Mr. Miller. This he conceded was 
at least $5,000.00 per month. (Divorce Trial pp. 281-286, 288-289). This was admittedly 
used to pay his personal living expenses. (Divorce Trial p. 289, lines 16-21). This is the 
very situation that the adverse inference rule is intended to address. (Divorce Trial pp. 253-
257). The Appellee at first denied, but eventually conceded, that the business pays many of 
his personal living expenses such as: (i) "rent", (ii) "utilities", (iii) "vacation cash", (iv) 
"legal fees", (v) "medical expenses", (vi) "pocket money", etc. (Appellee Brief p. 29; 
Divorce Trial pp. 221, 258, 275-276, 279-280, and 289-290). However, this conceded 
income amounts are not shown on his personal financial declaration form. (Trial Exhibit 
No. 6; Addendum No. 12). These figures are actually deducted from his "estimated" income 
of $1,800.00. The fact that he now diverts his personal income to various trusts does not 
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mean his income is any less. (Divorce Trial p. 289, lines 16-21). The income is just hard to 
find and even harder to verify. 
The Appellee tries to justify the large diversion of income and assets into the hands 
of third parties based upon a claim that he was "protecting assets". (Divorce Trial p. 261). 
The central issue is protecting the assets from "whom". At no time during the pendency of 
the case and during the two (2) days of trial was there a single incident identified that 
threatened the financial viability of the business. There was no evidence offered that 
commercial liability insurance is not available, or that the insurance costs are exorbitant. 
(Divorce Trial p. 206, lines 1-5). The Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 61 shows that he has 
such insurance. This was simply an attempt to avoid his marital obligations. (Divorce Trial 
p. 218, lines 15-20; p. 287, lines 23-25; p. 294, lines 1-7; and p. 309, lines 3-8). This was 
protecting the assets and income from the wife who is a true and needful creditor. 
M. A Spouse Can Be Held Accountable for Income Not Adequately 
Disclosed or Verified by the Recipient. 
A spouse cannot avoid or minimize a spousal support liability obligation by refusing 
to provide relevant financial and tax accounting evidence regarding his or her actual income. 
Marv Ann Moon v. Stanley W. Moon 1999 Ut.Ct.App. 012, 973 P.2d 431 (recognizing in 
Tf 10 and f56 of the opinion that a party in a domestic law proceeding has an affirmative duty 
to provide the appropriate and verifiable evidence of income to the trial court). The refusal 
to provide financial income is nothing more than an attempt to mislead the trial court. 
Silence can be deceptive. Civil litigation is intended to lead to the truth of the matter. Neal 
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C. Jones v. Superior Court 58 Cal.2d 56, 372 P.2d 919 (Cali. 1962) (holding that the 
revealing of the truth of the matter is the critical goal of the court even in criminal cases). 
This is a legal duty apart from the adverse inference rule that is applicable in this case. 
In this regard, it has been held that the required evidence includes such common items 
as: (i) business accounting records, (ii) personal accounting records, (iii) bank records, (iv) 
tax returns, (v) wages, (vi) salary records, (vii) interest, (viii) capital gains, (ix) rents, (x) 
royalties, (xi) partnership income, (xii) Subchapter "S" income, and (xiii) estate income. 
Marv Ann Moon v. Stanley W. Moon 1999 Ut.Ct.App. 012, 973 P.2d 431. All sources of 
income must be identified by the recipient. Steven Neil Breinholt v. Jan E. Breinholt 905 
P.2d 877 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The sources and amounts of income is not limited to those 
that are taxable for federal income tax accounting purposes. UCA §78-45-7.5(4)(b). 
When considering the evidence as it relates to financial matters, it is normally within 
the discretion of the trial court to find (based upon the admitted evidence) that a party may 
be earning greater income than what is claimed or that the party had a greater ability to earn. 
Jeanette Osguthorpe v. Jerry Osguthorpe 804 P.2d 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); GlenP.Willev 
v.Rosalind A. Willev (II) 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The court's Findings of Facts do not disclose why Mr. Miller's earnings ability has 
decreased by 60%. Mr. Miller conceded that he historically earned $5,000.00 per month 
(Divorce Trial p. 289), but now earns but $2,000.00. (Divorce Trial pp. 50, 209-210). He 
fails to adequately explain any reason for this reduced level income other than the obvious. 
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He also failed to explain why his monthly income in 1999 suddenly exceeds $500.00. 
The amount of historical income that a party has generated can be disregarded by the 
trial court only when there is clear evidence that the spouse can no longer earn this level of 
income. Carolyn M. Endrodv v. Laszlo Endrodv 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Jana 
Griffith v. David G. Griffith 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (noting detailed findings 
of fact were entered on the issues of any underemployment and the averaging of bonuses 
paid over the past five (5) years). An abuse of discretion will be present where there are 
inadequate findings of fact as to the financial issues, the income of the parties and at least the 
statutory alimony factors that are required to be taken into account by the trial court in a 
given case. Erin Jo Chambers v. Thomas D. Chambers 840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
If the trial court fails to make these findings of fact, then it has not done its job. 
Mr. Miller failed to present a candid picture of his financial resources. This is not 
optional under the law. When such occurs, then the historical evidence is the best evidence 
and should have been used by the court. The court has failed to apply the proper law and has 
failed to impose consequences when a party refuses to provide the required information 
especially when such is readily available to the party. (Divorce Trial p. 308, line 2). 
N. The Child Support Award was Erroneously Determined by the Trial Court. 
The level of child support in the Decree of Divorce is clearly erroneous. Mr. Miller 
proven monthly income is $5,000.00 per month and not $2,500.00, if the law is properly 
applied to the facts of the case. In addition, there were identified premarital real estate assets 
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that could be used to generate income and pay support. This must be included 
The Appellee claims that the premarital real estate does not generate any income. 
(Appellee Brief p. 31). The evidence is clear that during the marriage the assets did generate 
income. (Trial Exhibits Nos. 24-28; Addendum Nos. 18-23; Divorce Trial pp. 63-74). At 
the very least, they can be sold to generate income to pay delinquent support and accrued 
alimony or even the wife's necessary legal fees. There was no evidence offered that the 
assets were valueless. The reason that they are retained by Mr. Miller is because they remain 
valuable and will again become productive the moment the divorce is concluded. 
Mr. Miller did not testify regarding the amount of money it would take to make the 
real estate productive again. Here again, such is not the type of evidence he would be willing 
to candidly provide. This would be adverse to him, this would frustrate his stated objective 
of not paying am£ support to the wife. (Record pp. 140-141; Trial Transcript pp. 218-219, 
233-234, 276, 280, 287, and 309; Trial Exhibit No. 46). The child support award is 
erroneous as a matter of law because it was not computed with reference to his historical 
earnings ability and because there is no evidence offered to explain why his earnings had 
decreased from $5,000,00 a month in 1993-1995 to $2,500.00 at the time of the trial. 
(Divorce Trial p. 288). The Findings on this critical issue are inadequate as a matter of law. 
O. Issues of Law Regarding the Award of Alimony Are 
Reviewed Under the Correction of Error Standard. 
An Appeals Court will usually review the trial court's determination of the law under 
the correction of error standard. Steven Neil Breinholt v. Jan E. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1995). Since the District Court failed to address the necessary alimony 
factors, including Mr. Miller's historical earnings ability, and failed to apply the proper law, 
the rulings regarding alimony and child support are both wrong as a matter of law. 
P. The Amount of Alimony to Be Paid in a Given Case is a Matter of 
Discretion Which is to be Exercised Within Established Limits. 
The amount of alimony to be awarded in a given case is not fixed by a mathematical 
formula contained in a statute or referenced in any given case. It is a matter of discretion for 
the trial court to determine in the first instance. Glen P. Willev v. Rosalind A. Willev (II) 
914 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Steven Neil Breinholt v.. Jan E. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995); Anthony W. Rudman v. Evelyn W. Rudman 812 P.2d 73 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). The basic factors on which an award is to be based are partially set forth in 
UCA §30-3-5(7). This takes into account the payee spouse's available financial resources 
and the abilities to generate income and needs and the payor spouse's based upon on the 
same factors. Debbie A. Lee v. Dennis V. Lee 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Hugh 
P. Ruhsam v. Janet E. Ruhsam 742 P.2d 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Vera Morgan v. Wallace 
J. Morgan 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Joan Eames v. Emerson Eames 735 P.2d 395 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); James Davis v. Penny A. Davis 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988). 
In fixing alimony, exact equality of income and income producing assets are not 
required, but sufficient "parity" between the parties is necessary in order to allow both parties 
to be on equal footing financially speaking as of the time of the divorce. Walter J. Howell 
v. Barbara J. Howell 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) cert, den'd 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 
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199H: Jana Griffith v. David G. Griffith 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
The trial court must enter sufficient Findings of Fact so that the appeals court can 
determine if the alimony ruling is rationally based upon the proper evidence and law in the 
case. Michael J. Godfrey v. Maria O. Godfrey 854 P.2d 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The Findings of Fact regarding alimony are insufficient and are merely conclusionary. 
They fail to address Mr. Miller's historical income ability and why it has been reduced so 
significantly. The economy has boomed during the 90fs. The Court fails to identify specific 
facts as to why the temporary alimony was to be vacated in its entirety or even why the 
Respondent could not pay a single dime of it during the four (4) years the divorce was 
pending. The evidence clearly shows a large disparity in income, financial abilities, and 
financial resources. The existing marital financial resources were used, consumed, and 
diverted by Mr. Miller after the couple separated and were then ultimately awarded to him. 
Q. The Trial Court Should Use Extraordinary Measures to Secure the 
Payment of Support Where There is a History of Non-Payment. 
A trial court must use good judgment so as to insure or to secure the payment of 
financial support in those cases where there has been a long history of noncompliance with 
the payment of the court ordered support. Cheryl J. Beals v. Richard C. Beals 682 P.2d 862 
(Utah 1984) (a case showing a chronic refusal to pay support and real difficulty in securing 
the voluntary payment of the support). This is one of those cases. (Record pp. 312-315,252-
254, and 312-315; Divorce Trial p. 294, lines 2-10). 
Where a spouse fails to voluntarily pay the support which has been decreed by the 
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court, and where there is evidence of the ability to pay, then other measures must be taken 
by the trial court to insure that the payments will be made or to secure the payment with liens 
on other valuable assets of the obligor. (Divorce Trial pp. 64-67). Going to jail has not 
deterred Mr. Miller. (Divorce Trial p. 218). He will perjure himself about his actual income 
and hide income and assets before he will pay any support to his wife. (Record pp. 191 -193; 
Divorce Trial p.198, lines 6-10; p. 218, lines 8-20; p. 219, lines 4-21; p. 258, lines 9-19; p. 
266, line 3-14; pp. 275-276; p. 280, lines 3-10; pp. 287, 289, and 309). 
The Decree of Divorce clearly fails to provide any assurances or security for the 
payment of support. The Court should have imposed a judicial lien upon all real property 
of Mr. Miller including those properties now titled in third party names such as the 
commercial property. (Divorce Trial pp. 64-67). Failure to do so is clear error. 
R. The Failure to Award the Wife Her Beneficial Interest 
in the Commercial Property was Clear Error. 
The general rule provides that marital assets should be divided immediately unless it 
creates a real hardship or creates a significant penalty on account of the immediate division. 
Connie T. Dunn v. Harold K. Dunn 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Betty M. Gardner 
v. William J. Gardner 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988); Marvin L. Woodard v. Mildred L. 
Woodward 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1983). In this case, the current division of the assets has 
created a real financial hardship to the wife. It has greatly prejudiced her future security. 
There is no fixed formula for dividing marital assets. Marilyn Rappleve V. George 
Brvce Rappleve 855 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Jan Watson v. Wavne B. Watson 837 
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P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The trial court is responsible for the initial division of the 
existing marital assets and such division will not be changed absent an abuse of discretion. 
Donna S. Tallev v. Glenn E. Tallev 739 P.2d 83 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Marilyn Rappleve v. 
George Brvce Rappleve 855 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Vera Morgan v. Wallace J. 
Morgan (II) 854 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The court must enter detailed Findings of 
Fact on how it arrived at its ruling or it will have abused its discretion. Marilyn Rappleve 
v. George Brvce Rappleve 855 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Debra A. Lee v. Dennis V. 
Lee 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Connie T. Dunn v. Harold K. Dunn 802 P.2d 1314 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). The Findings of Fact in this case lack any specifics. 
There is no dispute that the commercial property was acquired during the marriage. 
Because it is zoned commercial, it has significant value and appreciation potential. The 
business and this real property are the most valuable assets the couple acquired together. At 
one time, this real property was offered for sale for $325,000.00. (Divorce Trial p. 210). 
This was a lengthy marriage in which the wife contributed significantly to the family and the 
assets of Mr. Miller and even the business itself. (Divorce Trial pp. 47-48, and 63-74). 
The wife's ownership interest must be awarded to her because the trial court awarded 
her no alimony whatsoever. The present ruling is just shocking. For this reason alone, the 
division is grossly unfair and deprives her of any means of future support. There is no real 
parity as to the ability to earn or generate income. (Divorce Trial p. 283, lines 1-6). A 
o 
comparison between the wife's personal tax returns and those that the business filed show 
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a clear disparity in the ability to generate cash, accumulate assets, or provide fringe benefits 
such as free housing, medical reimbursement, attorney fees, vacation cash, etc. 
S. The Tax Exemptions Award in the Decree of Divorce is Erroneous as a Matter of Law. 
The Appellee fails to acknowledge that the award of the tax exemption is not a true 
balancing test under all conditions. By law, the Court is not to award the tax exemptions to: 
(i) a parent who is not current on his support, and (ii) where the award does not result in a 
tax benefit. UCA §78-45-7.21(3) and (4). The evidence on this issue is quite clear. The 
Appellee owes a significant support debt and he does not file personal income tax returns. 
Appellee claims that the support became delinquent because of the temporary alimony 
obligation that was imposed (which he has never paid) and the costs of the divorce litigation 
(which again he did not personally pay). (Divorce Trial p. 294, lines 2-10; Trial Exhibit No. 
6; Addendum No. 12, p. 91 [Not a single personal creditor is listed]). 
T. The Amount of Fees are Uncontested by Specific Evidence. 
The Appellee claims that the award of attorney's fees should not be changed. 
(Appellee Brief p. 36). At the time of trial, the standard monthly billing statement had not 
yet been prepared for Mrs. Miller. However, the evidence is clear that the fee claim was 
based upon contemporaneous records. (Divorce Trial pp. 169-172). The claimed fees were 
not factually challenged during the divorce trial. (Divorce Trial pp. 167-172). The court 
should have awarded the full $9,000.00 that was claimed. The additional cost of defending 
the contempt claims should also have been awarded. (Record p. 1296; Addendum No. 11, 
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p. 81). This should have been in the sum of $5,429.00. 
The Appellee also declares that the claim was excessive. (Appellee Brief p. 37). Mrs. 
Miller seeks no fees for Mr. Hoyt. The fees claimed were only for the actual time charges of 
W. Kevin Jackson, Esq. Not a single dollar of which was actually shown by the evidence to 
be excessive. The fees of Mr. Hoyt were never claimed if indeed they were based upon any 
frivolous claims. Until Mr. Miller conceded that all entities (i.e. the trusts, etc.) could be 
treated as marital assets, Mrs. Miller was compelled to chase them as fraudulent transfers. 
(Divorce Trial pp. 11 and 262-263). The concession came on the eve of trial. 
U. The Retroactive Vacating of the Alimony Award 
Support was Improper as a Matter of Law. 
The Appellee, in his brief, does not address the legal principle that a support award 
becomes unalterable once it accrues whether temporary or otherwise. The Appellee merely 
contends that he objected to an^ award. (Appellee Brief p. 34; Divorce Trial p. 219). The 
Appellee fails to cite any legal authority as to the nonapplication of UCA §30-3-10.6(1). The 
court merely declared (without any cited facts) that the temporary order was "improperly 
entered." (Record p. 1118; Findings of Fact flO). 
The Appellee fails to disclose that the request to reduce (i.e. eliminate the spousal 
support obligation) was heard on its merits and denied. (Divorce Trial p. 219). At that time, 
Mr. Miller was claiming that his income was only $500.00 per month. (Record pp. 50,191). 
Even if UCA §30-3-10.6(1) does not apply, then res judicata and the law of the case 
doctrine prohibits the retroactive elimination of support when the request was heard on the 
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merits and then denied. Polly Plumb v. State of Utah 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990); Archie 
Thurston v. Box Elder County 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995). 
V. The Verified Costs of the Action Should Have Been Awarded to the Petitioner. 
Rule 54(d) provides that costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party. Mrs. Miller 
prevailed and obtained a Decree of Divorce from her spouse. (Record p. 1109; Findings of 
Facts TJ3; Addendum No. 5, p. 45). The court did not make it a mutual Decree of Divorce. 
She made a claim for costs of $ 1,355.42. The District Court wholly failed to articulate proper 
reasons for not awarding costs to the prevailing party. Indeed, no written objection (timely 
or otherwise) was filed. (Record p. 1067; Addendum No. 9, p. 67; Divorce Trial p. 167). 
W. An Appeal Court Reviewing an Equity Case has the Authority 
to Review Both the Law and the Facts of the Case. 
The Supreme Court has declared that an Appeals Court, in reviewing a case involving 
any equitable relief or claims, the review authority includes an independent examination of 
both the applicable law and the facts of the case. Max Harding v. Bernice Harding 488 P.2d 
308 (Utah 1971); Millie Hatch v. Kenneth Bastian 567 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977); Joyce 
Christensen v. J. Clavde Christensen 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981): Joel Izatt v. Marv Izatt 627 
P.2d 49 (Utah 1981); A. Lavar Jensen v. K.H. Brown 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981). 
The party asserting the special review of equity cases must nonetheless still show that 
the final ruling of the trial court was based upon misapplied law or results in an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. Joyce Christensen v. J. Clavde Christensen 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 
1981); Joel Izatt v. Marv Izatt 627 P.2d 49 (Utah 1981). This is one of those cases. 
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In applying the doctrine, the reviewing court will still accord the trial court's 
considerable deference regard the initial ruling of the lower court due to its advantaged 
position in the case and the reviewing court may not disturb the result of the trial absent clear 
evidence to the contrary. Joyce Christensen v. J. Clavde Christensen 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 
1981); Joel Izatt v. Mary Izatt 627 P.2d 49 (Utah 1981) (holding that a reversal will not be 
automatic even though the appeal's court sees the facts quite differently). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the evidence and the controlling law, the District Court should have: (i) 
reduced the unpaid spousal support to a judgment, (ii) awarded permanent alimony of 
$1,000.00 per month, (iii) awarded attorney's fees in full and the fees incurred in the 
contempt matters, (iv) award costs, (v) secured the support with liens upon the real property, 
(vi) compounded the interest on the support arrearages, (vii) dismissed the contempt, and 
(viii) erroneously found the Petitioner in contempt. The Court of Appeals should reverse any 
money judgments and sanction orders relating to the contempt claims in their entirety. The 
Petitioner should also be awarded her costs and attorney's fees for this appeal. 
DATED this 4th day of December, 2000. 
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